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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 85-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/17/2011 Page 1 of 4
EXHIBIT A
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 85-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/17/2011 Page 2 of 4
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June 8, 2011
specifically, how do we get businesses
to do more in terms of hiring, spend
Iess on redtape, less on bureaucracy,
and reduce the regulatory burden in
smart ways?
The current administration has said
some of the right things but actually
moved in the wrong direction. We have
seen a sharp increase in the last couple
of years in what are deemed to be
major economically significant rules.
That is defined as regulations that impose
a cost on the economy of $100 million
or more.
According to the administration's Office
of Management and Budget, the
current administration has been regu-
Iating at a pace of 84 major rules per
year. By way of comparison, that is
about a 50-percent increase over the
regulatory output during the Clinton
administration, which had about 56
rules per year, and an increase from
the Bush administration as well. So we
have seen more regulations and more
significant regulations.
I was encouraged to hear President
Obama's words when he talked about
the Executive order in January, which
is entitled "Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review." But now we need
to see action. We need to see it from
the administration, from individual
agencies to provide real regulatory relief
for job creators to be able to reduce
this drag on the economy.
One commonsense step we can take is
to strengthen what is called the Unfunded
Mandates Relief Act. It was
passed in 1995. It was bipartisan. I was
a cosponsor in the House of Representatives.
It is an effort to require Federal
regulators to evaluate the cost of rules,
to look at the benefits and the costs,
and to look at less costly alternatives
on rules.
The two amendments I would like to
offer over the next few days as we consider
the legislation before us would
improve this Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act, and it would reform it in
ways that are entirely consistent with
the principle President Obama has laid
out and committed to in his Executive
order on regulatory review.
The first amendment would require
agencies specifically to assess potential
effects of new regulations on job
creation-so focusing in on jobs-and
to consider market-based and nongovernmental
alternatives to regulation.
This would broaden the scope of
the Unfunded Mandates Relief Act to
require cost-benefit analysis of rules
that impose direct or indirect costs of
$100 miilion a year or more. So, again,
this is for major rules of $100 million or
more. It would also require agencies to
adopt the least costly or least burdensome
option that achieves whatever
policy goals have been set out by Congress.
It seems to me it is a commonsense
amendment. I hope we will get
bipartisan support for it.
The second amendment would extend
the Unfunded Mandates Relief Act to
so-called independent agencies which
today are actually exempt from the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
- SENATE
cost-benefit rules that govern aII other
agencies. In 1995, we had this debate
and determined at that time we would
not extend the legislation to independent
agencies. In the interim, independent
agencies have been providing
more and more rules, have put out
more and more regulations, and are
having a bigger and bigger impact. An
example of an independent agency
would be the SEC, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, or the CFTC,
which is the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. These are agencies
that, although independent in the executive
branch, are very much involved
in putting out major rules and regulations.
It is sometimes called the "headless
fourth branch" of government because
their rules are not reviewed for
cost-benefit analysis, even by the OMB,
the Office of Management and Budget,
in its Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, so-called OIRA.
We have looked at some GAO data
and put together various studies, and it
appears to us that there are about 200
regulations that were issued between
1996 until today that would be deemed
to have an impact of $100 million or
more on the economy but were automatically
excluded from the Unfunded
Mandates Relief Act because they were
deemed to be from independent agencies.
So it is basically closing a loophole
and closing this independent agency
loophole, which I believe is a sensible
reform. It has been endorsed by many
people, including, interestingly, the
cument OIRA Administrator and the
President's regulatory czat, Cass
Sunstein, who, in a2002 Law Review article,
talked about the fact that this is
an area where UMRA ought to be extended
because, again, there were so
many independent agencies that were
putting out regulations impacting job
creation in this country.
No regulation, whatever its source,
should be imposed on American employers
or on State and local governments
without serious consideration of
the costs, the benefits, and the availability
of a least-burdensome alternative.
Both these amendments would
move us further toward that sensible
goal, and I hope the leadership will
allow these amendments to be offered.
I think they fit well with the underlying
legislation. If they are offered, I
certainly urge my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to support them.
I yield the floor. I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call.
The bill clerk proceeded to caII the
roII.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
MORNING BUSINESS
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. president. I ask
unanimous consent that Senators be
s3607
allowed to speak as i.n morning business
for up to 10 minutes each.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
TRIBUTE TO LOUIS E. GIVAN
Mr. MoCONNELL. Mr. President, I
rise today to recognize a distinguished
Kentuckian who has worked tirelessly
on behalf of our Nation's soldiers, sailors
and marines for more than 40 years.
Louis E. Givan, a lifelong resident of
my hometown of Louisville, has played
a vital role in protecting the men and
women of our Armed Forces and our
country's defense.
Formerly a sailor himself in the U.S.
Navy, he has served for the last 11
years as the general manager of
Raytheon Missile Systems operations
in Louisville. I was saddened to hear of
his retirement from that position this
coming July 5. He will certainly be
missed.
Mr. Givan-or, to those who know
him, Ed-was a 1966 graduate of St. Xavier
High Schooi in Louisville and in
1970 earned his bachelor of science degree
in mechanical engineering from
the J.B. Speed School of Engineering
at the University of Louisville. In 1968,
he began working at the Naval Ordnance
Station in Louisville, and he
stayed at that post until 1996, in various
engineering and supervisory positions.
In 1996 the Naval Ordnance Station
transitioned to private ownership, and
Ed's leadership was crucial in making
that transition a successful one. The
facility eventually became part of
Raytheon Missile Systems, and Ed was
appointed general manager in 2000. As
general manager, Ed has led Raytheon
Missile Systems in Louisville to great
success, success for both the company
and for the local community. They design,
develop, and produce vital weapons
systems for our armed forces, enabling
America to have the most formidable
military force in the world.
Weapons produced at the Louisville facility
are used by our forces in all parts
of the globe, including in Iraq.
Kentucky is lucky to have benefitted
from Ed's dedication, commitment to
excellence, and leadership for so many
years. I am sure his wife Velma; his
sons Eddie, Tony, and Chris; and his
grandchildren Benjamin, Nathan,
Isaac, Macy and Natalie are all very
proud of what Ed has accomplished. I
wish him the very best in retirement,
and I am sure my colleagues join me in
saying that this U.S. Senate thanks
Mr. Louis E. "Ed" Givan for his faithful
service.
CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous
consent that the following letter
be printed in the Rncono.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the
Rncono. as follows:
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 85-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/17/2011 Page 3 of 4
s3608
U.S. Ssllero,
Washington, DC, June 6, 2011.
Hon. ERIC H. HOLDER. Jr..
AttmneA General\ U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
DEAR ATTORNEY GENERAL HoLDER: I am
writing about the Justice Department's implementation
of the Crime Victims' Rishts
Acb-an act that I co-sponsored in 2004.
These questions relate to an Office of Legal
Counsel ("OLC'1) Opinion made public on
May 20, 2011 and more broadly to concerns I
have heard from crime victims' advocates
that the Department has been thwarting effective
implementation of the Act by failing
to extend the Act to the investigative phases
of criminal cases and by preventing effective
appellate enforcement of victims' rights. I
am writing to ask you to answer these questions
and explain the Department's actions
in these areas.
GOVERNMENT PROTECTION OF VICTIMS' RIGIITS
DURING INVESTIGATION OF A CRIME
When Congress enacted the CVRA, it intended
to protect crime victims throughout
the criminal justice process-from the investigative
phases to the final conclusion of a
case. Congress could not have been clearer in
its direction that using "best efforts" to enforce
the CVRA was an obligation of
"[o]fficers and employees of the Department
of Justice and other departments and agencies
of the United States engaged in the detection,
inaestigd,tion, or prosecution of crime
. . . ." 18 U.S.C. 93771(c)(1) (emphasis added).
Congress also permitted crime victims to assert
their rights either in the court in which
formal charges had already been filed ,,or, if
no prosecution is underwag, in the district
court in the district in which the crime occurred."
18 U.S.C. gBZTI(dXB) (emphasis
added).
Despite Congress'clear intention to extend.
rights to crime victims throughout the process,
the Justice Department is read.ing the
CVRA much more narrowly. In the recent
OLC opinion, for example, the Department
takes the position that ,,the CVRA is best
read as providing that the rights identified
in section 3771(a) are guaranteed. from the
time that criminal proceed.ings are initiated
(by complaint, information, or indictmenr)
and cease to be available if all charges are
dismissed either voluntarily or on the merits
(or if the Government declines to bring formal
charges after the filing of a complaint).',
The Availability of Crime Victims, Rights
Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004,
Memorandum from John E. Bies (Dec. 12,
2010, publicly released May 20,2011) (hereinafter
"OLC Opinion"). Indeed, in that same
opinion, I am surprised to see the Depart_
ment citing a snippet from my floor remarks
during the passage of the CVRA for the prop_
osition that crime victims can confer with
prosecutors only after the formal filing of
charges. See id. at 9 (citing 1b0 Cong. Rec.
54260, 54268 (Apr. 22,2004) (statement of Sen.
Kyl).
I did want to express my surprise that your
prosecutors are so clearly quoting my re_
marks out of context. Here is the full pas_
sage of my remarks, which were part of a
colloquy with my co-sponsor on the CVRA.
Senator Feinstein:
Senator Feinstein: Section . . . (a)(b) pro_
vides a right to confer with the attorney for
the Government in the case. This right is in_
tended to be erpansiue. For example, the vic_
tim has the right to confer with the Govern_
ment concerning any critical stage or dis_
position of the case. The right, howeuer. is not
limited to these eramples. I ask the Senator if
he concurs in this intent.
Senator Kyl: Yes. The intent of this sec_
tion is just as the Senator says. This risht to
confer does not give the crime victim any
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE June 8,2011
right to
-
direct the prosecution. Prosecutors right to fair treatment and their right to
should consider it part of their profession to confer with prosecutors when the Justice Debe
available to consult with crime victims partment is negotiating pre-indictment plea
about concerns the victims may have which agreements and non-prosecution agreements
are pertinent to the case, case proceedings or with defense attorneys, including negotiadispositions.
Under this provision, uictims are tions within the Fifth Circuit?
able to confer with the Gouernment's attorneA
about proceedings after charging.
150 Cong. Rec. 54260, 54268 (Apr. 22, 2004)
(statements of Sens. Feinstein & Kyl) (emphases
added). Read in context, it is obvious
that the main point of my remarks was that
a victim's right to confer was "intended to
be expansive." Senator Feinstein and I then
gave various examples of situations in which
victims could confer with prosecutors, with
the note that the right to confer was "not
limited to these examples." It is therefore
troubling to me that in this opinion the Justice
Department is quoting only a limited
portion of my remarks and wrenching them
out of context to suggest that I think that
crime victims do not have any right to confer
(or to be treated with fairness) until after
charging.
In giving an example that the victims
would have such rights after charging, I was
not suggesting that they had no such right
earlier in the process. Elsewhere in my remarks
I made clear that crime victims had
rights under the CVRA even before an ind.ictment
is filed. F or example, in the passage
quoted above, I made clear that crime victims
had a right to consult about both ,,the
case" and "case proceedingg',-i.g., both
about how the case was being handled before
being filed in court and. then later how the
case was being handled in court ,,proceedings."
As another example, Senator
Feinstein and I explained that we had drafted
the CVRA to extend a right to victims to
attend only "public" proceedings, because
otherwise the rights would extend. to grand
jury proceedings. See, e.g., lbO Cong. Rec.
54260, 54268 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of
Sens. Feinstein & Kyt). Of course. no such
limitation would have been necessary under
the CVRA if CVRA rights attach (as the Department
seems to think) only after the filing
of a grand jury indictment.
Courts have already rejected the Justice
Department's position that the CVRA applies
only after an indictment is filed.. For
example, in In re Dean, b2T F.gd 891 (bth Cir.
2008), the Department took the position that
crime victims had no right to confer with
prosecutors until after the Department had
reached and signed a plea agreement with a
corporation (BP Products North America)
whose illegal actions had resulted in the
deaths of fifteen workers in an oil refinery
explosion. Of course, this position meant
that the victims could. have no role in shaping
any plea deal that the Department
reached. In rejecting the Department's position,
the Fifth Circuit held that ,,the govern_
ment should have fashioned a reasonable
way to inform the victims of the likelihood
of criminal charges and to ascertain the victims'
views on the possible details of a plea
bargain." Id. at 394.
In spite of this binding d.ecision from the
Fifth Circuit, crime victims' ad.vocates have
reported to me that the Justice Department
is still proceeding in the Fifth Ciicuit and
elsewhere on the assumption that it has no
obligations to treat victims fairly or to con_
fer with them until after charges are for_
mally filed. Given the Fifth Circuit,s Dean
decision, this position appears to place the
Department in violation of a binding court
ruling that extend.s rights to thousand.s of
crime victims in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas. And more generally, the bepart_
ment's position simply has no grounding in
the clear language of the CVRA.
My first question: What is the Justice De_
partment doing to extend to victims their
SRIME VI6TIMS, RIGIIT To AppETTLATE
pRorEcrroN
Protection of crime victims' rights in appellate
courts is an important part of the
CVRA. As you know, when Congress passed
the CVRA, the federal courts of appeals had
recognized that crime victims could take ordinary
appeals to protect their rights. See,
e.g., Doe u. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 46 (4th
Cir. 1981) (rape victim allowed to appeal district
court's adverse "rape shield statute"
ruling); United States v. Kones,77 F.3d 66 (3rd
Cir. 1996) (victim allowed to appeal adverse
restitution decision). Congress sought to
leave these protections in place, while expanding
them to ensure that crime victims
could obtain quick vindication of their
rights in appellate courts by providing-in
$3771(d)(3)-that "[i]f the district court denies
the relief sought, the [victim] may petition
the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus."
18 U.S.C. S3771(d)(3). Ordinarily,
whether mandamus relief should issue is d.iscretionary.
The plain language of the CVRA,
however, specifically and clearly overruled.
such discretionary mandamus standard.s by
directing that "[t]he court of appeals shall
take up and decide such application forthwith
. . . ." 18 U.S.C. S3771(d)(3) (emphasis added).
As I explained when the Senate considered
the CVRA:
[W]hile mandamus is generally discretionary,
this provision [18 U.S.C. gB??1(d)(g)]
means that courts must review these cases.
Appeilate review of denials of victims' rights
is just as important as the initial assertion
of a victim's right. This provision ensures review
and encourages courts to broadlg d.efend.
the victims' rights.
150 CoNG. REc. 54270 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement
of Sen. Kyl) (emphases added). Simi-
Iarly, the CVRA's co-sponsor with me, Senator
Feinstein, stated that the Act would
create "a new use of a very old procedure,
the writ of mandamus. This provision will
establish a procedure where a crime victim
can, in essence, immediately appeal a d.enial
of their rights by a trial court to the court
of appeals." 150 CoNG. REc. 54262 (statement
of Sen. Feinstein) (emphases added); see also
id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (crime victims
must "be able to have the appellate
courts take the appeal and order relief). In
short, the legislative history shows that
$ 3771(d)(3) was intended to allow crime victims
to take accelerated appeats from dis_
trict court decisions denying their rights and
have their appeals reviewed. under ord.inary
standards of appellate review.
In spite of that unequivocal legislative history,
the Justice Department has in past
cases asserted a contrary position. In In re
Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 200g). Ken
and Sue Antrobus sought to obtain appellate
review of a ruling by a trial court that they
could not deliver a victim impact statement
at the sentencing of the man who sold the
murder weapon used to kill their daug:hter.
The Tenth Circuit ruled against them on the
basis that the Antrobuses were not entiiled
to regular appellate review, but only discre_
tionary mandamus review. See id. at Il24_25.
The Tenth Circuit did not consider the legis_
lative history in reaching this conclusion,
leading the Antrobuses to file petitions for
rehearing and rehearing en banc-petitions
that recounted this legislative history. In re_
sponse, the Justice Department asked the
Tenth Circuit to deny the victims' petitions.
Remarkably, the Justice Department told
the Tenth Circuit that it could ignore the
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 85-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/17/2011 Page 4 of 4
June 8, 2011
Iegislative history because the CVRA "is unambiguous."
Response of the United States,
In re Antrobzs, No. 08-4002, at 72 n.7 (10th Cir.