Document Text Content
February 16, 2017
In the fourth quarter of 2016, Boothbay Absolute Return Strategies, LP (the “Fund”) earned a net return of
approximately +0.04%. 1,2
Since the Fund opened on July 1, 2014, it has returned 16.10%. 1,2 In that period, the Fund’s largest monthto-month
drawdown has been -1.4%, versus -8.9% for the S&P 500, -1.5% for the HFRX Absolute Return
Index, -8.9% for the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index and -5.3% for the HFRX Market Neutral Index.
Performance and Commentary
October November December 2016 ITD
Sharpe
ITD*
Sortino
ITD*
Boothbay Absolute Return
Strategies, L.P
-0.14% -0.05% 0.23% 3.84% 16.09% 2.25 6.37
S&P 500 -1.94% 3.42% 1.82% 9.54% 14.21% 0.51 0.93
HFRX : Equity Market Neutral -0.13% -0.04% -1.07% -5.08% 2.51% 0.23 0.48
HFRX : Absolute Return -0.39% -0.16% 0.20% 0.31% 2.13% 0.36 0.98
HFRX : Global Hedge Fund -0.57% 0.87% 0.86% 2.50% -3.50% -0.42 -0.43
* For Sharpe/Sortino Ratio calculations, 1-Month LIBOR is set as the risk free rate.
We ended 2016 with a slightly positive quarter, bringing net performance for the year to +3.84%. Consistent
with the trend seen earlier in the year, 2016 has been described by investors and financial media as among
the worst years for multi-manager multi-strategy firms, on both an absolute and risk-adjusted return basis.
While we consider earning +3.84% to be disappointing for our strategy on an absolute return basis, doing so
with a maximum drawdown of 1.4%, and in what was a challenging environment for low-net exposure
relative value strategies, leaves us viewing 2016 as a “good” bad year.
For a second consecutive year, the Fund generated positive net returns overall on the days when the S&P
500 Index was negative. The S&P had 121 losing days in 2016 (producing losses of over -66% in total) 3 and
on those days, we were positive approximately 55% of the time, and generated almost half of our total net
returns for the year. Given that we aim to be a protector of capital in markets that most managers will lose
capital, this sampling is especially gratifying. As we look forward, we remain as encouraged as ever that our
combination of unique “niche” strategies and strategies with structural edge, alongside our allocations to
low-beta alpha-generating stock pickers and quantitative portfolio managers, will deliver strong riskadjusted
returns over various market cycles.
Before going into the performance attribution for Q4 and 2016 overall, we want to re-visit a topic discussed
in our Q1 2016 letter related to hedge fund crowding, which investors have continued to ask us about the
past several months. The question raised is typically some variation of the following: Given that Boothbay
allocates to low-net equity focused managers, who may have similar strategies to those that comprise other
multi-manager platforms, why has Boothbay been less-exposed to deleveraging and hedge fund crowding
1 Assumes Boothbay Absolute Return Strategies, LP, Onshore Accelerator Share Class 1A (2-year lock and 14% incentive allocation).
2
Performance figures reported herein are shown unaudited, net of fees/allocations and expenses; include the reinvestment of dividends, capital gains,
and other earnings; and may be subject to adjustment.
3 S&P 500 negative-return analysis calculated using Bloomberg closing prices for SPX Index.
effects, which seem to impact other multi-manager funds in a greater way?
Platform Beta
Equity market performance is a large predictor of returns for many long/short equity hedge funds, due to the
large equity beta exposure with which many funds run. 4 At Boothbay, we generally run with limited net
equity market exposure (on average 6-8% historically) and have maintained low correlation to market
indices. While the sources of our returns will generally be idiosyncratic, there is no question that the
tremendous amount of capital that has flown into the low-net multi-manager, i.e. “platform”, category, has
created an even greater risk of exposure to “Platform Beta” for some of our managers, even while avoiding
broader equity market beta.
Platform Beta is a term we have heard used to describe the overlap of long and short positions, across some
of the largest market-neutral, multi-manager hedge fund managers. While these overlapping names may be
viewed as “smart money” positioning in some sense, there is also meaningful risk associated with being in
crowded longs and shorts due to the viciousness of the cascading effects when these portfolios are being
liquidated, or re-sized quickly, as we observed in Q1 2016. For a variety of reasons, we believe that
Platform Beta has a true positive expectancy over time and with much less risk than other traditional factor
risks, especially ones taken on by long-only or long-biased investors. While we consider it to be an obvious
goal to avoid material exposure to all known market risk factors, we also attempt to reduce our more
difficult to measure Platform Beta exposure when possible. Despite the positive return expectation of
Platform Beta, we do not think a large or concentrated exposure to this factor is beneficial. Perhaps even
more importantly, we do not believe that all alpha is created equally, and we are trying to provide the most
uncorrelated alpha as possible to our investors.
So how do we minimize overexposure to Platform Beta? We can monitor data that imperfectly points to
crowded names or themes, but the most direct way we seek to avoid crowded names is through our overall
portfolio construction and manager-selection process. This is demonstrated in our continued focus on “First
Loss” allocations as well as investments in the strategy category we call “Other”, which is comprised of
niche strategies outside our more traditional long/short fundamental and quantitative strategies. These
alternative categories have served as a valuable source of alpha as well as diversification away from
Platform Beta. Additionally, even in our more traditional strategies, we focus on allocating to smaller
managers who can have larger parts of their portfolios in smaller capitalization companies, which tend to be
less trafficked by the larger funds, and therefore are also less subject to the effects of large industry
deleveraging. We cannot avoid all of the dangers of hedge fund deleveraging but our conscious attempts to
target differentiated strategies, and to limit concentration, has allowed us to be less impacted by these flows
than several other multi-manager platforms.
Portfolio Attribution and Risk
Within our Multi-Strategy platform, the “Other” category was the largest contributor for both Q4 and 2016
overall, contributing gross returns of +0.82% in Q4 and +2.19% YTD. The remaining quarterly and full-year
gross return attribution within the Multi-Strategy platform were: “Fundamental L/S” at -0.86% in Q4 and
+1.16% YTD, and “Quantitative” at 0.29% in Q4 and -1.53% YTD. Our First Loss platform allocations
contributed gross-returns of +0.72% in Q4 and +6.60% YTD. 5
The Fund averaged approximately 0.39% daily Value at Risk during Q4 vs. 0.41% in Q3 (95% Confidence
Interval, excluding First-Loss allocations). As stated in last quarter’s letter, we expect to see an increase in
our VaR during Q1 2017 primarily through a combination of new manager allocations and a pick-up in
overall market volatility due to macro events on the horizon. We expect the Trump Presidency, additional
4
For example, Goldman Sachs Prime Services reported hedge fund net exposure to be between 50% and 67% throughout 2016. (Goldman Sachs
Securities Division: Prime Services Weekly 12.22.2016)
5
Performance Attribution figures reported herein are shown unaudited, gross of fees/allocations and expenses; include the reinvestment of dividends,
capital gains, and other earnings; and may be subject to adjustment.
interest rate hikes by the Fed, and global geopolitical catalysts (e.g. elections, referendums) in 2017 to
contribute to a rise in market volatility. These factors should help us to approach our target daily VaR of
0.80%, and also provide an attractive environment for many of our strategies to generate alpha. While
having more risk on the balance sheet does imply that our return volatility and drawdowns will be larger, it
is reasonable to expect that any positive returns would increase as well.
Manager Attribution:
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For the fourth quarter of 2016, 42% of “Fundamental L/S,” 45% of “Quantitative,” and 67% of
“Other” managers were profitable.
The top five performing managers contributed 38% of the quarterly total positive return, with the
largest single manager positively contributing 9%. The bottom five performing managers made up
56% of negative returns, with the largest single manager negatively contributing 17%.
While 2015 was a stronger year for our strategy overall compared to 2016, we were pleased to see
a continual diversification of return attribution across our managers in 2016. The below statistics
compare 2016 with 2015 and present a similar picture of limited return concentration.
Positive
Attribution
Negative
Attribution
2016 Total 15.94% -7.42%
Top 5 Contributors 6.48% -2.54%
Largest Contribution 2.25% -0.67%
2015 Total 22.77% -6.92%
Top 5 Contributors 7.31% -3.55%
Largest Contribution 1.82% -1.03%
� As of December 2016, the Multi-Strategy platform had 28 Fundamental L/S Equity managers, 23
Quantitative managers, 10 “Other” managers (these Multi-Strategy platform figures include 9
Hybrid allocations 6 ), and 13 First-Loss managers.
Assets Under Management
As of January 1, 2017, Boothbay’s total AUM was approximately $190 million ($230 million including
capital from First-Loss share class).
As always, I am available to answer all investment and business inquiries. Peter Bremberg and Daniel
Bloom are available to answer any questions related to financial operations.
Sincerely,
Ari Glass
Managing Member
Boothbay Fund Management LLC
6
“Hybrid allocations” refers to accounts for which we have both a First-Loss and Multi-Strategy investment.
IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES
The information presented herein is confidential and proprietary, and may not be (i) used by, or on behalf of, you for any purpose other than
evaluating an initial or continued investment in Boothbay Absolute Return Strategies, LP (the “Fund”), or (ii) disclosed by, or on behalf of, you to
any third party, in each case except with the prior written consent of Boothbay Fund Management, LLC (“Boothbay”). This communication is for
information purposes only and is not intended as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security.
This letter includes forward-looking statements. Although Boothbay believes that the expectations and views reflected in such statements are
reasonable, such statements are subject to a number of assumptions, risks and uncertainties which may cause actual results, performance or
achievements to be materially different from future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking
statements. Forward-looking statements, and the expectations and views reflected therein, expressed in this letter may change at any time, without
notice. Prospective investors are cautioned not to invest based on these forward-looking statements.
Performance figures (which include the reinvestment of dividends, capital gains and other earnings) included herein are based on unaudited
information, may be subject to adjustment and are shown net of fees/allocations and expenses. Results for individual investors may vary based on,
among other things, the timing of capital contributions and withdrawals.
An investment in the Fund is speculative and involves a high degree of risk. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. There
can be no assurances that the Fund will continue to have a similar return on invested capital because, among other reasons, there may be
differences in economic and market conditions, regulatory and political climate, portfolio size, investment opportunities, expenses and structure.
Accordingly, when deciding to make an investment, potential investors are urged to review carefully all disclosure documentation, including the
Fund’s confidential private offering memorandum, and consult with their counsel and advisers.
This material is not intended to represent the rendering of accounting, tax, legal or regulatory advice. A change in the facts or circumstances of
any transaction could materially affect the accounting, tax, legal or regulatory treatment for that transaction. Nothing herein should be interpreted
to represent concentration limits, exit strategies or sector allocation guidelines, all of which are subject to change without notice.
References to the S&P500 and any other benchmark(s) referred to herein are for illustrative purposes only. Any such benchmarks are included
merely to show general trends in the markets in the periods indicated and are not intended to imply that the Fund’s portfolio is similar to any such
benchmarks either in composition or risk. Comparisons to benchmarks have limitations because natural characteristics of such benchmarks, such
as volatility, among other things, are likely to differ from those of the Fund. Boothbay does not attempt to track a benchmark and there is no
guarantee that the Fund will meet or exceed any such benchmark.