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05/12/2014 the Cathedral – to Shlomo Gazit
• As the year 2015 begins, we
find ourselves at the height of a
historic earthquake, in multiple
dimensions, the like of which hasn’t
been seen since the end of WWI and
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
• In the Middle East – within
three years, the "Arab spring" turned
into the "Islamic winter" – borders
have vanished and centuries of
conflicts between tribes and factions
are erupting onto the surface.
• The bi-polar and multi-polar
world we knew has been replaced by a
world with not even one geopolitical
center of gravity. It is a Gestalt in
which everything depends on
everything else, and dealing with the
challenges requires global cooperation
.
• Israel finds itself at the center
of a kind of "perfect storm,"the only
outpost of the western way of life in
the Middle East – at the meeting point
of the "clash of civilizations" between
Islam and the West, as Huntington
envisioned it, and at the same time, in
the spinning "eye of the storm" of the
clash of titans within Islam itself:
between Sunni and Shi'ite, between
tradition, extremism and terrorism on
the one hand, and modernity and
moderation on the other; between the
dream of "past glory" and the vision of
a "leap into the future”. And all of this
is drenched in a lot of blood.
• This drama that has washed
over the Arab world bears two lessons
and one insight for us:
The 1 st lesson: "Be modest in
prophecy". In particular, when it comes
to the future. Mubarak for example had
about 400,000 people at his disposal
working in various security agencies in
order to preemptively predict events
such as those that took place at Tahrir
Square. And he did not foresee the
uprising. So who can?
The 2 nd lesson: When friends, and even
the leaders among us, say: "Don't get
swept into a panic – if something really
grave happens (Iran for example) – the
US will not stand by. The world will
take action!"
And I say: Don't bet on it. Look at Syria.
Assad has massacred 200,000 of his own
people – with tanks, artillery, fighter
jets, even chemical weapons – and the
world did not lift a finger.
And the one insight: To all our
opponents and even friends who tell us
that our lack of success in reaching an
agreement with the Palestinians is the
root of all the troubles in the Middle
East – the original sin! – I say: this is not
true!
Even if I, in 2000 (or Rabin and Peres in
1994 or Olmert in 2008), were to have
reached a peace treaty with the
Palestinians – which would have been
implemented a long time ago the
"Muslim Brotherhood" would still have
taken control over Egypt and Al-Sisi
would still have taken it back a short
time after.
• Syria would still have been
embroiled in a bitter civil war. And
Iran – would still be striving for
regional hegemony and nuclear
military capability.
• The reasons for all the above
are deeply rooted in the history of the
nations and the region – and do not
stem from the Israeli Palestinian
conflict (they may be related to it in
another way, which I will get to later
on).
• In the new reality forged by the
"Arab Spring," there is good news and
bad news for us.
Let's start with the bad news:
ISIS, the disintegration of Syria, the
events in Iraq – all of these are bad news
that prove to us, time and time again,
that the Middle East is indeed a tough
neighborhood. There is no mercy for the
weak, and there will be no second
opportunity for those who don't defend
themselves. Every year, new threats
arise. And the old ones: Hezbollah, Iran,
terrorism –are all "alive and kicking" and
growing even stronger.
But there is good news too. Israel is the
strongest country in the region, from
Tripoli in Libya to Tehran. It's the
strongest militarily, strategically, and
economically, and if we know act
wisely–diplomatically too. Equally
important: Israel will continue to be the
strongest country in the region in the
foreseeable future – especially if we
manage to identify and cultivate these
sources of empowerment and advantage
– including:
• Armed Forces capable of
defeating any outside combination of
threats, including terrorism.
• A strong and growing economy
in an open relationship with global
markets.
• Foreign policy that assures
international backing, especially
American – diplomatic and economicbacking
Israel's positions, and which
holds the "moral high ground" vis-avis
our enemies and opponents.
• The fact that Israel is stronger
than any combination of enemies is
what enables us to act from a position
of strength and self confidence in order
to change the reality : to counter the
threats and to seize the opportunities.
• Let me elaborate briefly about
each of the threats:
Two ironies and one insight about Isis.
Assad slaughtered 200,000 of his people
including by using chemical weapons –
and that wasn't enough to get the British
parliament and Prime Minister Cameron
or the American Congress and President
Obama to act.
• Then, ISIS beheaded two
journalists (not really a new practice in
the Middle East) in front of the
cameras – and within 48 hours the
world was united against them. Better
late than never, so we have little reason
to complain about the result. However,
there is something to learn about the
superficiality of the decision-making
processes in our world.
Second: let's assume for a moment that
ISIS is restrained in about a year (and
hopefully – crushed) – who wins?
• The main winner is Assad,
since the Coalition would have wiped
out his main adversary, freeing him to
focus more intensely on the rest of the
rebels – meaning the "moderate"
rebels, which the Coalition purports to
train and reinforce in order to take him
down.
Iran also wins and of course Hezbollah -
all members of President Bush's Axis of
Evil. In other words: the Coalition is
doing some of the "dirty work" for them.
• In my best assessment, the
Turks are right in their position that
there is no point in striking ISIS unless
you also set a goal to take down Assad,
and act to achieve it.
The Turks are right in their call for a
"humanitarian strip" – 25-30 km into
Syrian territory along the borders, and
declare it a “no fly zone”, a place for
refugees (there are several million of
them) to assemble and where they can
receive humanitarian aid.
• What hasn't been said explicitly
is that such a deployment might lead
sooner or later to engagement with the
Syrian Air Force – followed by the
Syrian Air Defense – which could
develop into an opportunity to
fundamentally change the balance of
power and the course of the war
against Assad's regime.
And one insight: ISIS may not be as
strong as it is being portrayed. A
coherent ,intense, coordinated action
during the next year or two, particularly
if performed according to the Turkish
outline and with massive Turkish
involvement – could well put the Genie
back into the bottle. However – let us
make no mistake – ISIS is part of the
radical Islamic web of terrorism. A web
that is loosely knit, yet survives on
strictly restricted resources – and
demonstrates operational flexibility,
survivability and a fanatic adherence to
the goal.
• We're talking about ALQ,
Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, Lashkar-e-
Taiba in India, the Houthis in Yemen,
the Shabab in Sumali, Boko Haram in
Nigeria and many more – all across the
Muslim strip, from Marrakesh to
Bangladesh.
• And this web is very resilient.
Dealing with it will take war lasting for
a generation, not just a few years. The
struggle will require collaboration not
just between the moderate Arab
nations and Turkey – but a longstanding
collaboration between the US,
Russia, China, India and Europe – all
are are potential targets and victims of
this terror everyone to some extent.
Forging this collaboration is
categorically more important than the
events in Ukraine or the North Chinese
Sea Islands.
• Hezbollah is busy in Syria –
and would generally prefer to avoid
provoking Israel. Some here would say
that Nasrallah has been deterred, that
the memory of 2006 is still fresh in his
mind and he will not act. I have my
reservations about the deterministic
nature of this statement. "Deterrence"
is a somewhat elusive term. This is not
a "zero sum game" on a onedimensional
bar. This is a complex and
context-related issue. Although under
normal circumstances, each side has a
fundamental position (let's assume for
a moment that Hezbollah's position is
"avoid provoking Israel") – it is still
not hard to imagine an event, or
damage to Hezbollah's (or Nasrallah's)
assets or prestige, that could lead it ,
despite its basic position, to take action
contrary to its true fundamental
position.
• Incidentally, this doesn't apply
solely to "Hezbollah" – but to us too.
• Therefore, the working
assumptions and the operational
deployment must include the
possibility of deterioration into a widescale
confrontation with Hezbollah.
• And now, to Iran – which
under certain circumstances might be
the element that ignites or incites
"Hezbollah" into action.
• Let us be clear – a nuclear Iran
is a central threat to the entire world
order, not just Israel. A nuclear Iran
means the end of the non-proliferation
regime– Saudi Arabia, within months,
Turkey within a few years and Egypt
might follow as well–and all will
become nuclear.
• Every third-grade dictator will
be able to ensure his survivability
against the outside world by following
in the footsteps of Pakistan, North
Korea and Iran.
• The "countdown" towards the
troubling vision of Prof. Graham
Allison of Harvard about nuclear
weapons in the hands of terrorists –
this countdown, even if it takes 15
years, will start. Therefore, blocking
Iran from becoming a "threshold
nuclear state" is crucial, and justifies
every effort.
• Right now diplomacy is in
hiatus at least until March 2015. It's
hard to imagine a good agreement with
the P5+1, and a bad agreement would
be best left unsigned. The problem is
that the Iranians have no real incentive
to reach a “final agreement” that would
keep them from becoming a nuclear
power.
• As far as they're concerned, at
any given time an improved "interim
agreement" would be better (unless the
P5+1 yield to a bad agreement.)
• The Iranians are very
sophisticated. In their opinion (I
emphasize: in their opinion), the
American government has changed its
goal without admitting it, from "Iran
will not have military nuclear
capability. Period." to "Iran will not
have military nuclear capability on our
watch "
•
• This is of course a completely
different thing. And this perception
only reinforces Iran's obduracy and
the delaying tactics that they've
adopted.
• Israel has a supreme interest in
"keeping all the options on the table".
However, today, mostly against the
backdrop of the drawn-out talks –
Israel has an interest in maximizing its
understanding with the United States
and trying to convince it of the need
for determination and perseverance;
for "sticks" as well as "carrots"; and of
the importance of completely losing
any illusions regarding the objectives
of the Ayatollahs' regime.
• And from here, a sharp segue to
the diplomatic challenges Israel faces,
from the minor (for now) to the major.
• Israel is far from being a leaf in
the wind. But the world has no
geopolitical center of gravity – not the
US, Russia, Europe or China –Israel
isn't omnipotent either.
• It is wrong to disregard what's
happening in Europe. It will not be
resolved by saying that Europe is
ridden with anti-Semitism (though
there's quite a bit of truth to that).
• Regarding BDS, I used to tell
the members of the Cabinet that– as
long as these voices are coming from
Eritrea or Mauritania, we can live with
it for years. When it comes from
Scandinavia and Britain – it's a
different story, and must be taken
seriously.
• Right now it is being espoused
by parliaments, not governments. But
it could expand – to trade unions, to
the academia, to consumer
organizations and NGOs. And then,
heaven forbid, eventually to
governments – which will say "we are
of the people ". We mustn't forget that
Europe is Israel's No. 1 trading partner
- not the US and not China. And
Europe, with North America and a few
countries in the East, is at the heart of
the "reference group" of liberal
democratic countries to which we want
to belong, and rightfully so.
• This leads us to the US – and
there, the diplomatic challenge is far
greater. Israel is a sovereign state. On
more than one occasion, I told
President Obama, and before that
Presidents Bush and Clinton, the
following: "On issues that we believe
are essential to the security and future
of Israel and of the Jewish people,
Israel will make its decisions alone and
on its own responsibility and act upon
them. We cannot, and will not want
to", I added, "delegate the
responsibility for such decisions,
when required, even to the best of our
friends – which is you."
The US presidents, I note, did not
always like this statement – but they
respected it.
• In the same token, I told
members of the cabinet more than once
– "we must always remember that the
US is also a sovereign state. And it
expects us to respect its right to form
its positions on the issues crucial to it,
based on its own interests ". And we
have to respect that.
• Without derogating from our
responsibility to make and execute
sovereign decisions – the reality is that
there isn't full symmetry here.
• Our relations with the US
President, the administration, the
Congress and the American people are
vital to the State of Israel.
• The United States is Israel's
main ally and strategic support. Our
relations with it are the cornerstone of
Israel's military capabilities, the IDF's
qualitative edge, and Israel's strategic
and political positioning.
• We receive $3 billion a year
from the US, going back some 40
years now. What social or economic
budget items would we forgo to make
up the ₪12 billion gap if this
assistance disappears?
• They're the only ones who can
provide us with F-35 jets, the best
aircraft in the world.
• These are mutually beneficial
relations. The US also benefits from
the unprecedented cooperation
between our intelligence communities.
And so do we.
We never expected, and will never ask
others to fight for us – yet the US has
deployed advanced radar systems in
Israel to provide early warning against
long-range missiles, and holds military
exercises on our soil and in the
Mediterranean , preparing an American
response in case Israel has to defend
itself against missile attacks from Iran.
• We received about $1 billion
from the US, by order of President
Obama, for "Iron Dome", and
assistance for the David's Sling and
Arrow programs continues.
• We turn to the US to veto
hostile initiatives against Israel in the
United Nations Security Council. Or to
soften the conclusions of the
Goldstone Commission and its ilk.
• It is to them that we turned
(and they responded to the best of their
ability) in rather tense times, when a
handful of our people were besieged in
the embassy in Cairo, with an angry
mob at the door.
• Secretary of State Kerry, and
President Obama – went to great
lengths – and paid a considerable
political (and often personal) price – to
help us achieve a breakthrough with
the Palestinians, though the effort did
not succeed. Nor did we succeed
(Rabin and Peres, myself, Olmert and
Bibi as well). They shouldn't be
ridiculed and debased for this. They
should be appreciated. Even if we do
not agree on all the details.
• We will yet need their help in
facing many trials in the future.
• I recommend that we all
remember this well. The rules of
working with the Americans: Do not
marginalize yourself. Do not fold. Yes
– remember what the U.S. is for Israel.
And Maintain–at almost any cost –
mutual relations of trust and respect.
It's good for Israel.
• The American Congress,
President Obama, Biden and Kerry are
part of the solution, even if it tarries.
They are not part of the problem.
• Ben Gurion used to say, with
his iron logic, that "the future of Israel
depends on our strength and our
righteousness."
"Our strength" – that is the IDF's might
and its strategic capabilities, the backing
of the superpowers, our economic
strength, and our social solidarity.
"Our righteousness" – not as an abstract
concept – is our capacity to hold
the"moral high ground" by means of a
calculated effort to behave and be
perceived as acting in good faith – to
obtain peace, even if it delays.
• This is also an an essential
condition for achieving internal
solidarity and the world's support for
Israel (or for the support of most of the
world that's important to us).
• This is also an essential
condition for achieving internal
solidarity and willingness for sacrifice
in a society where being called for
battle or routinely risking your life is
not a theoretical notion, but rather part
of our life experience that repeats itself
time and again.
• The fighting spirit, resilience
and the internal solidarity are deeply
bound to both our strength and our
righteousness. Our righteousness is
just as important as our strength.
Our righteousness, and not our strength
in and of itself, is what gives Zionism's
struggle its meaning and sense of
purpose (especially for ones who can
choose). The support of a superpower
• and the resilience of our society
and economy, which are among the