Document Text Content
17 November, 2011
Article 1. NYT
U.S. Hones Warnings to Egypt as Military Stalls Transition
David D. Kirkpatrick and Steven Lee Myers
Article 2. NYT
Europe’s Contagion
Editorial
Article 3. New York Post
High stakes in Syria
Amir Taheri
Article 4. Guardian
Turkey has a key role in Syria
Simon Tisdall
Article 5. Foreign Policy
Barack Obama's Foreign Policy
November 16, 2011
Article 6. Project Syndicate
America in the Asian Century
Dominique Moisi
Article 1.
NYT
U.S. Hones Warnings to Egypt as Military Stalls Transition
David D. Kirkpatrick and Steven Lee Myers
November 16, 2011 -- CAIRO — Brazen attempts by Egypt’s interim military rulers to hold on to power long after elections have elicited a sharp reaction domestically and for the first time have prompted Washington to warn about the potential for new unrest.
After months of mixing gentle pressure with broad support for the ruling military council, the Obama administration has sharpened its tone, senior administration officials say, expressing concern that the failure to move to civilian control could undermine the defining revolt of the Arab Spring.
The shift in tone is part of a difficult balancing act for Washington, which is keen to preserve its ties to the military and its interests in the region, chiefly Egypt’s role in maintaining peace with Israel. But Washington also hopes to win favor with Egypt’s newly empowered political opposition while avoiding the appearance of endorsing the militarys stalled transition to democracy. All things considered, some here have suggested, the change in tone may be intended to placate Egyptian public opinion rather than actually press the military to give up power.
“I think they are working for their own interests, particularly regarding the slow transition of power,” said Shady el-Ghazaly Harb, a prominent liberal activist who was among the leaders of the Egyptian revolution. “The U.S. wants to guarantee that the coming government will be on good terms — I won’t say loyal, but friendly — and the support for SCAF is related to that.” SCAF is the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Egypt’s ruling military council.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton underscored the shift in a speech last week that her aides later said was a deliberate warning to the military council, which assumed power after President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. The military had initially pledged to hand over control to civilians by September, but it now says that a presidential election will not occur before 2013. And last week it laid out a blueprint for the next constitution, giving the military special political powers and protection from civilian oversight into perpetuity.
“If, over time, the most powerful political force in Egypt remains a roomful of unelected officials, they will have planted the seeds for future unrest, and Egyptians will have missed a historic opportunity,” Mrs. Clinton warned.
“When unelected authorities say they want to be out of the business of governing,” the United States expects them “to lay out a clear road map” and “abide by it,” she added.
Given Washington’s long support for Mr. Mubarak, and Mrs. Clinton’s comment last month approving of the military’s extended timetable for electing a civilian president, there was suspicion over Washington’s intentions. The shift occurred at the same time as a broader effort by the Obama administration to counter anti-American sentiment and reach out to opposition leaders across the political spectrum.
The United States “wants to have the cake and eat it, too,” said Nabil Fahmy, a former Egyptian ambassador to Washington, arguing that the United States wants to promote democracy without dealing with the pressure it would put on American interests in the region.
The military’s attempts to protect its power and privileges indefinitely have created an awkward situation for Washington. The United States, through the Pentagon in particular, has long nurtured close ties with the Egyptian military, which still receives $1.3 billion in American aid each year. American officials hope that whatever government emerges will continue to support American policy, including maintaining ties with Israel and distance from Iran.
At the same time, the United States’ standing in public opinion in Egypt and around the region continues to suffer because of decades of support for undemocratic governments like the military-backed system that controlled Egypt under Mr. Mubarak. Remaining aloof from the debate over the military’s future role here risks reinforcing those criticisms at a time when democratic changes are giving public opinion new weight.
As part of its broader outreach, the Obama administration has also met with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group whose political party is poised to win a major role in the country’s new Parliament and remains the biggest political counterweight to the military council.
Jacob Walles, a deputy assistant secretary of state, met for the first time this week with the leaders of the Brotherhood’s newly formed Freedom and Justice Party at its new headquarters in Cairo. While American diplomats have had intermittent contacts for years with Brotherhood lawmakers in the Egyptian Parliament, officials here said Mr. Walles’s meeting appeared to underscore Mrs. Clinton’s pledges to cooperate with Islamist parties that respect democracy.
Others said it might instead have been a sign that Washington simply realized that the Brotherhood was certain to play a crucial role in Egypt’s future and was likely to win a large bloc of seats in the parliamentary elections that begin this month.
“They confirmed that they are keen to support the democratic process, and they will accept any results of the elections and deal with any government that respects human rights and the rights of women and minorities and the democratic process,” said Essam el-Erian, a veteran Brotherhood leader and the vice chairman of its new party, who met with Mr. Walles. “And we are keen and eager to say that we respect the democratic process and the rights of all people according to the Constitution and the law.”
Administration officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss private diplomatic exchanges, said they hoped that a combination of internal and external pressure on the council would persuade it to yield power and submit to civilian oversight. In addition to the public comments by Mrs. Clinton, other senior American officials have privately urged the council to revise its recent proposals to preserve power, the officials said.
The officials noted that since Mr. Mubarak’s ouster, the council’s leaders had repeatedly offered, then backed away from, some proposals only after street protests and public pressure, in a kind of prolonged back-and-forth that some noted reflected a true, if messy, democratic process taking root.
But administration officials and Egyptian activists note worrying signs. The military core of Mr. Mubarak’s government has “reasserted itself again,” a senior administration official said. “We don’t have great expectations that this is going to be the creation of a democratic system,” the official said, referring to the coming elections.
At best, the official added, the elections will be “a transition to a transition,” one that could leave the military as the de facto power in Egypt for years to come, as it was under Mr. Mubarak’s rule.
The military has said that it intends to hold ultimate political power even after the election of a Parliament in the coming months, and that it will play a role in drafting the constitution as well. It has refused to lift the Mubarak-era “emergency law” allowing arrests without trial, and it has sent as many as 12,000 civilians to military trials.
While the administration’s changes in tone risk upsetting a pivotal ally where anti-American sentiment — and, in some quarters, support for the military — runs high, they are also drawing rare praise from activists here who say they appreciate Washington’s help.
“I think that Secretary of State Mrs. Clinton delivered a clear-cut message to the SCAF, and I think they got that message: that the SCAF is not an elected body and must deliver the authority and turn over power,” said Emad Gad, an analyst at the government-financed Al Ahram research institute and now a leader of the Social Democratic Party.
Mr. Gad contended that over the long term such pressure could only benefit the American relationship with a democratic Egypt. “I think more than 50 percent of the Egyptians think the SCAF is trying to kill the Egyptian revolution,” he said.
Article 2.
NYT
Europe’s Contagion
Editorial
November 16, 2011 -- Two years of gross mismanagement of the euro-zone debt crisis have all too predictably produced a wider crisis of market confidence that now threatens the entire 17-nation euro zone. This week’s formation of new technocrat-led governments in Greece and Italy has not calmed fears. Practically every euro zone country is paying the price in higher interest costs and ebbing economic growth.
The only country that isn’t suffering — yet — is Germany, whose competitive export-driven economy feeds on foreign demand and an exchange rate held down by its neighbors’ troubles. But all European countries cannot be Germany and run net surpluses, especially if Berlin insists on policies that keep factories shuttered and workers unemployed.
And German leaders are wrong if they think their country will remain unscathed as its major trading partners and neighbors unravel.
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany has been talking a more pro-European line. But she is still insisting on growth-killing austerity as the price for European bailouts and still blocking the European Central Bank from printing more euros and acting as a lender of last resort.
Mrs. Merkel’s advisers insist that she is doing what the German people want. That is not leadership. She needs to challenge her voters simplistic stereotypes of southern European sloth and tell them the truth: The real threat to Germany isn’t inflation; it is an economic collapse across Europe. And Germany has a huge amount to lose from a fracturing of the European Union.
European stock and bond markets are already treating that as an ever-more-realistic possibility, shunning even moderate levels of risk and pushing interest rates to unsustainable levels. As far as they can see, Mrs. Merkel and her fellow euro-zone leaders haven’t come up with an adequate plan, sufficient political will or sufficient cash to halt the contagion. As far as we can see, they are right.
The political changes at the top of Greece and Italy are promising. Greece’s new prime minister, Lucas Papademos, and Mario Monti of Italy are internationally credible economists, committed to making painful but much needed reforms, including liberalizing labor markets, shrinking overgrown bureaucracies, shedding state properties and rooting out corruption.
Given their training, they surely understand that their economies are not now strong enough to absorb more austerity, including broad new taxes or further sweeping service cuts. Mr. Papademos and Mr. Monti should press their fellow European leaders for a new and better deal. Even with the best leadership, neither Greece nor Italy will be able, on their own, to restore their fiscal health and help slow the spreading financial contagion. That will require substantial and immediate help from their euro-zone partners, starting with Mrs. Merkel.
An all-out effort by the European Central Bank to buy bonds, lower interest rates and inject new liquidity into the markets may still calm the contagion if it begins in the next few days. The bank’s new president, Mario Draghi, may be willing to play this role, if Germany stops standing in the way.
Mrs. Merkel must make clear that she will support the central bank taking on this expanded role. And now that new, credible leaders are in office in Athens and Rome, she and other euro-zone leaders need to meet with them and negotiate more growth-friendly reform packages. There is very little time left to avoid financial catastrophe.
Article 3.
New York Post
High stakes in Syria
Amir Taheri
November 16, 2011 -- As Arab foreign ministers met in Rabat, Morocco, yesterday to discuss Syria, one question was on every mind: Is the country already in a civil war?
Some of the facts on the ground suggest so. With more than 350 killed so far, November has been the bloodiest month since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad began last spring.
Defections from the army, which started as a trickle, now look like a torrent. In October, the number was around 800. The best total now available is about 17,000. The defectors have organized themselves as the Free Syrian Army and are creating credible command-and-control structures.
Since September, the FSA has carried out a number of symbolic attacks against the regime. And now the “shadow army,” as Syrians call it, seems to be planning more spectacular operations.
On Monday, the FSA claimed an attack on an army convoy near Deraa, the southwestern town where the revolution started. Official accounts reported at least 34 soldiers killed.
Yesterday, the FSA attacked the headquarters of the Air Force Intelligence Agency at Harasta near the capital Damascus. Since Hafez al-Assad, an air-force officer and Bashar’s father, seized power in a coup in 1970, the AIA has been the nerve center of the regime’s security system.
Also this week, reports surfaced of attacks by armed tribesmen on three military outposts near the Iraqi border.
Despite all that, it may be premature to speak of civil war in Syria.
In a civil war, a society is divided into armed camps that, initially at least, are roughly the same size. That’s not the case in Syria, where the uprising is backed by an overwhelming majority against a government that’s dominated by a small minority — the Ba’ath Party. To make matters worse, the Ba’ath is dominated by the Nusairi (Alawite) religious minority, a mere 5 percent of the population.
Thus, Syria’s is a nationwide revolution against a minority regime.
Almost all Syrians agree that the situation is untenable. Assad’s policy of rule by massacre has few supporters outside his clan. Judging by the revolution’s most popular slogan — “Assad Get Out!”— a majority may support demands for Assad to stand down, as suggested by Jordan’s King Abdullah.
Nevertheless, the Assad clan still controls enough military and financial assets to continue its rule-by-massacre strategy.
The result could be the disintegration of the Syrian army and the emergence of armed groups beyond the control of either the government or the Syrian National Council, the opposition’s umbrella organization. That could lead to violence spilling into neighboring countries, especially Iraq and Lebanon.
Rather than speculating about a civil war, the Arab League and the international community should focus on the dangers that the Syrian situation poses for regional peace.
A Franco-British resolution on Syria won a majority at the UN Security Council last month but was killed by Russian and Chinese vetoes. The Security Council should take up the issue again — this time to debate the threat to the region.
Last month, Russia and China tried to justify their vetoes by claiming that the Arab states were divided over Syria. This wasn’t true then and is less so now. The Arab League has suspended Syria’s membership and condemned the rule-by-massacre policy. Arab support is also building up for creating havens for Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan.
Moscow had also expressed concern that, with Assad’s demise, a new Syrian government might “ignore Russia’s interests in the Middle East.” Since the vetoes, however, the Syrian National Council has established contact with Russia and China to offer assurances that a democratic Syria would pursue “cooperation with all nations.”
SNC sources tell me that they’ve also “opened a dialogue” with Iran, Assad’s main supporter, amid signs that it, too, may no longer be so sure about the despot’s chances of survival.
America must take the lead in mobilizing international support for the Syrian revolution. By removing one of the last regimes that still sponsors terrorism, the victory of democracy in Syria is in America’s best national interests.
Article 4.
Guardian
Turkey has a key role in Syria – now and in the future
Simon Tisdall
16 November 2011 -- The Arab League's unexpectedly tough action in suspending Syria, ostracising President Bashar al-Assad, and inviting opposition leaders to talks in Cairo has outraged the regime in Damascus, which suspects a US-led conspiracy to impose forcible regime change. But the increased hostility exhibited by Turkey, Syria's most powerful and best-connected neighbour, may yet prove decisive as Ankara assumes a crisis leadership role.
Until the uprising tore apart old certainties, the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had invested considerable capital in improved ties with Syria, with which Turkey almost went to war in the 1990s. A turning point came with the 2004 free trade agreement. This interdependence now gives Turkey significant economic leverage. Ankara has already imposed unilateral sanctions and is considering additional measures including a cut in electricity supplies.
Erdogan turned the screw again this week, accusing Assad personally of "feeding on blood" after he failed to honour the Arab League peace plan. "No regime can survive by killing or jailing," he said. "No one can build a future over the blood of the oppressed."
Turkey's motives are not difficult to discern. Chaos on its fragile southern flank, and Syria's possible descent into civil war, would be reasons enough to prompt Ankara's intervention. But Erdogan was also incensed by weekend attacks on Turkey's embassy in Damascus and regional consulates, apparently orchestrated by the regime. The government issued a formal protest and advised Turks against travel to Syria, a reversal of its proud open-borders policy.
Turkey also appears motivated by a desire to keep ahead of evolving Arab opinion. "It can comfortably be said, in light of recent developments, that the countdown to the end of Syria's Assad regime has begun," said Today's Zaman columnist Bülent Kenes, reflecting official opinion.
With senior Saudi officials and King Abdullah of Jordan openly backing the revolt, and the violence escalating, Erdogan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, who have long harboured regional leadership ambitions, seem to be positioning themselves for a post-Assad future.
In this push towards the Syrian endgame they plainly have the enthusiastic backing of the US, for whom they are effectively acting as a local proxy in opposition to external actors such as the pro-regime Russia. Given Erdogan's sharp differences with Washington over Israel-Palestine and the Iraq war, this coincidence of view is not lacking in irony. "We very much welcome the strong stance that Turkey has taken and believe it sends a critical message to President Assad that … he should step down," said Ben Rhodes, Barack Obama's deputy national security adviser.
In a series of statements, Davutoglu has insisted it is "no longer possible to trust the Syrian government". Adding provocation to insult, he underscored Ankara's support for the protesters and specifically for the Syrian National Council, an opposition umbrella group based in Turkey that is seeking recognition from Ankara. "We will continue to take our place at the side of the Syrian people's rightful struggle," Davutoglu said.
As bilateral tensions rise, suggestions that Turkey may physically intervene in northern Syria to create a safe haven for civilians displaced by the violence are likely to resurface. Several thousand Syrian refugees are already sheltering inside Turkey, as are numerous Syrian army defectors. Possibly anticipating Syrian retaliation, the newspaper Hürriyet reported that President Abdullah Gül recently warned Assad would pay a heavy price for stirring up trouble in Turkey's Kurdish south-east.
Fears that a Syrian meltdown could seriously destabilise the wider neighbourhood are also driving Turkey's hardening response. Such a scenario could affect Iraq, where security concerns are rising as the US withdrawal nears completion, and even Iran, a close Assad ally.
For its part, the Syrian regime has pressing reasons to fear Ankara's animosity, as Gökhan Bacik pointed out in Today's Zaman. Unlike many Muslim countries, Turkey identifies strongly with Europe, the US and Nato. And in the past decade, Erdogan's Justice and Development party has made its brand of moderate Islamist politics acceptable to previously blinkered western eyes.
In other words, Turkey, with its majority Sunni Muslim population, furnishes a role model for the disenfranchised Sunni majority in Syria (and other Arab spring countries). Not only is Ankara encouraging revolution in Damascus, it is also living proof that Assad's politics of fear are outdated, that Syrians have before them a workable alternative paradigm, and that, after the revolution, the country's secular, Islamist and other sectarian traditions could fairly hope to co-exist peacefully, Turkish-style.
Article 5.
Foreign Policy
Barack Obama's Foreign Policy
November 16, 2011
Foreign-policy credentials: As president, Obama has taken on a number of major foreign-policy initiatives, including a renewed troop surge in Afghanistan, the negotiation of the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia, the NATO intervention in Libya, the withdrawal from Iraq, ongoing trade negotiations with China, and of course, the killing of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
Overview: Obama is a much different candidate today from the senator who distinguished himself by his opposition to the "dumb war" on his way to the presidency in 2008. Obama has turned out, in many ways, to have pursued a fairly conventional, at times, hawkish foreign policy. He has had some notable successes, such as the bin Laden raid and this year's withdrawal from Iraq -- albeit on a timetable negotiated by his predecessor -- and the successful overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi. All the same, "apology tours" and "leading from behind" -- referring to an unfortunate description of Obama's diplomatic strategy by a White House staffer -- have already become buzzwords for Republican candidates. He has also faced heavy criticism on the left for a sometimes inconsistent approach to international law in counterterrorism operations.
But with a significant economic recovery appearing unlikely and fewer domestic achievements to point to than he might have expected, coupled with the international inexperience of his opponents, Obama may make his foreign-policy wins the centerpiece of his reelection strategy.
Advisors: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon.
On the issues:
Afghanistan/Pakistan: "We have put al Qaeda on a path to defeat," Obama announced last June, noting that the 33,000 "surge" troops he sent to Afghanistan in 2009 would be out of the country by the summer of 2012. Although a constant barrage of drone strikes and special operations raids have taken a harsh toll on al Qaeda, it may be difficult for Obama to make the case that Afghanistan has achieved stability or that Hamid Karzai's government can stand on its own without U.S. assistance.
Relations with Pakistan have deteriorated significantly under Obama's tenure, particularly following the bin Laden raid. He has pledged to "constantly evaluate" the relationship between the two countries going forward but says he would be hesitant to cut off aid that could "help the Pakistani people strengthen their own society and their own government."
Military spending: Backed by his then current defense secretary, Robert Gates, Obama announced last April that the Pentagon will lead a "fundamental review" of U.S. military capabilities in order to cut $400 billion in defense spending over the next 10 years. "We need to not only eliminate waste and improve efficiency and effectiveness, but conduct a fundamental review of America's missions, capabilities, and our role in a changing world," Obama said. Of course, major cuts could come sooner than that if the congressional "supercommittee" fails to reach an agreement on deficit reduction by Nov. 23.
Immigration/borders: Obama insists that enacting comprehensive immigration reform, which would likely include a path to citizenship for at least some illegal immigrants already in the United States, is still a "top priority," but with little congressional enthusiasm for such a measure, it has been pushed to the back burner for now. Meanwhile, deportations of illegal immigrants are continuing at a record pace, though the administration touts the fact that a higher percentage of those deported have criminal records.
Obama has substantially increased the number of agents patrolling the U.S.-Mexico border, but has also mocked the fence-building enthusiasm of Republicans, saying they won't be happy until there's a "moat with alligators."
Israel/Palestine: Obama's engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has probably been the most frustrating foreign-policy initiative of his presidency and the one on which he is most often criticized by his Republican opponents. Obama continues to support negotiations on a two-state settlement of the conflict, but his best-remembered statement on the topic is controversial: his suggestion that Israel's pre-1967 war borders be taken as a starting point for negotiations, a position fiercely opposed by Israel. More recently, the administration has confirmed that it will veto Palestine's statehood bid in the U.N. Security Council.
Obama's relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has seemed very strained at times. In a recently overheard conversation he told French President Nicolas Sarkozy, "You're fed up with him? I have to deal with him every day."
China: Obama has repeatedly criticized China -- most recently at the APEC summit in Honolulu -- for currency policies that he says have a distorting effect on the global economy. The president has made a few cautious statements on China's human rights record but came under criticism for delaying a White House meeting with the Dalai Lama. This year, the administration confirmed a $5.8 billion package of arms sales for Taiwan that provoked a predictable Chinese backlash.
Foreign aid: In his 2010 address to the U.N. General Assembly, Obama announced an overhaul of U.S. foreign aid policies, which he vowed will place them at the center of U.S. foreign policy. In the speech he called aid a "core pillar of American power." Nonetheless, foreign aid to a number of countries was cut by Congress in the 2012 budget.
Iran/nukes: Early in his presidency, Obama made several overtures to Iran in an effort to improve relations. Critics say this engagement strategy went too far during the 2009 Green Movement uprising against the reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, when the Obama administration was reluctant to overtly back the protesters. Since then, the administration has instituted a number of new sanctions against Iran that are aimed at halting its nuclear enrichment program. "We are not taking any options off the table. Iran with nuclear weapons would pose a threat not only to the region but also to the United States," Obama said in a recent news conference in Hawaii.
Trade: In October, Obama signed long-delayed free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. On his trip to Asia this November, Obama is working to promote a new trans-Pacific free trade agreement. "We're not going to be able to put our folks back to work and grow our economy and expand opportunity unless the Asia-Pacific region is also successful," he said. Obama has indefinitely put on hold a campaign promise to renegotiate NAFTA.
War on terror/detainees: Obama signed an executive order closing the Guantánamo Bay detention center as one of his first actions as president. The facility remains open, however, largely due to congressional opposition over where to house the remaining prisoners. Obama has put a halt to the "enhanced interrogation techniques" employed by George W. Bush's administration but has enraged some civil liberties advocates by authorizing the extrajudicial killing of alleged al Qaeda terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen. Obama has also disappointed some liberal supporters by resuming military trials of terrorism suspects at Guantánamo.
Environment: Despite his stated support for environmental legislation and green energy, there has been little progress on passing major climate-change bills under Obama's watch. Thanks largely to Obama's public intervention, an agreement was reached at the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, but in failing to impose enforceable emissions targets, the meeting was widely considered a failure. This year, Obama abandoned tough new air-quality rules, adopted early in his administration.
Russia/reset: One of the centerpieces of Obama's first-term foreign policy was the effort to "reset" relations with Russia. The president successfully negotiated the New START nuclear reduction treaty, though there have been significant disagreements with both Russia and his GOP opponents over the contours of missile defense. Human rights advocates have criticized the president for ignoring the erosion of Russian democracy. Russia has also continued to stymie U.S. efforts to impose tough international sanctions on Iran and Syria. Obama seemed to have made friends with President Dmitry Medvedev, but relations with Russia may only get tougher, with Vladimir Putin's likely return to the Russian presidency.
Arab Spring: After a slow start, the Obama administration eventually came around to calling for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down, joining the NATO intervention in Libya, and supporting stricter sanctions against Syria. The president has been less outspoken about other Persian Gulf allies, including Bahrain, which hosts a key U.S. naval base. Obama has urged Egypt and Tunisia to "set a strong example through free and fair elections, a vibrant civil society, accountable and effective democratic institutions, and responsible regional leadership."
Other issues: Although he once described himself as a George H.W. Bush-school realist, in the past year Obama has learned to embrace humanitarian intervention, both in Libya and in central Africa, where military advisors have been sent to aid in the fight against the long-running insurgency by the Lord's Resistance Army. There's speculation that Nigeria may be next. It's a measure of how much things have changed in the last four years that Republicans are now attacking the Democratic president for trying to spread democracy and human rights at the barrel of a gun.
As the European economic crisis has worsened, Obama has been speaking out more in support of strong measures to protect the common currency. "Ultimately what they are going to need is a firewall that sends a clear signal we stand behind the European project and we stand behind the euro," he said during his recent trip to Australia.
Article 6.
Project Syndicate
America in the Asian Century
Dominique Moisi
2011-11-15 – At “ground zero” in lower Manhattan, two empty spaces will be filled by water cascades, memorializing in a serene and respectful way the victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Next to them, a powerful tower, designed by the architect Daniel Libeskind and nearly completed, rises vigorously into the sky, a symbol of the triumph of life over the forces of death. One word comes to mind to characterize the impression made by this place, the site of an unprecedented crime: resilience.
In a building that houses what will one day be a memorial museum, one can buy a DVD entitled “9/12: From Chaos to Community.” Ground Zero is the architectural and human proof that, despite America’s current economic woes, it would be premature, if not dangerous, to write the country off as a declining power. America has the moral and intellectual resources that it needs in order to rebound.
But what is necessary is not sufficient. In order to reinvent itself, if not to manage its relative international decline, America must proceed toward a rebalancing of its domestic and international priorities. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, a triumphant America withdrew from global responsibility, with tragic consequences for the balance of power in a Europe that was left to face its inner demons alone.
In the aftermath of World War II, by contrast, the US managed successfully to contain Soviet ambitions. Today, unlike in 1945, Americans do not confront an imminent threat. Russia may speak loudly (using its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council as a megaphone), but it is a greatly reduced rump of the Soviet Union. Likewise, while the nationalism of America’s principal rival, China, has become more assertive lately, the communist regime’s clear priority – indeed, the key to its stability – is domestic economic growth.
Indeed, the only obvious danger that the US faces stems from weapons of mass destruction, which could proliferate or be used by terrorist groups. But confronting this threat does not require a massive military budget or huge deployments of US troops all over the world. America has a much-needed opportunity to refocus on itself – to recover its inner strength without withdrawing from the world. As Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, America must enter a period of “restoration” of its fundamentals.
American foreign policy starts at home, and that means reining in budget deficits over the long term, reviving economic growth and job creation in the short term, and addressing the country’s deteriorating infrastructure. Indeed, America’s “aged modernity” has become a drag on its competitiveness, as well as an insult to its international image and a risk to the safety of its citizens.
Moreover, imperial fatigue has set in. Recent US history has been characterized by cycles of enthusiasm about foreign engagement. In the mid-1970’s, following the war in Vietnam, America, guided by President Jimmy Carter’s moralizing impulse, opted for “regionalization” of its engagements. But, given that the Soviet threat still existed, this effort came too early (and probably was carried out in the wrong manner).
Today, by contrast, the starting point for a reassessment of American priorities is more economic than ethical. But the reasoning is the same, for it is based on the conviction that more America in the world today implies less costly and confused interventionism tomorrow. That means that US foreign policy itself – defined in recent years by too much attention to the Middle East, and too little to Asia – must embrace a shift in priorities.
Of course, in the midst of today’s ongoing Arab revolutions, America cannot simply ignore the Middle East. Nor must the US give up hope on the Israel-Palestine front, or on its efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. But it is in Asia that history is unfolding – and where the US must define its long-term global strategy.
Must the US, as Henry Kissinger suggests in his latest book On China, consider the prospect of a “Pacific Community” that, unlike the Cold War-era Atlantic Community, is not based on common culture and values in the face of a direct threat, but on common interests in an “age of rebalancing of world order”?
America’s resilience may contrast with Europe’s multiple weaknesses. But resilience will not be enough. The US must get back into shape to face tomorrow’s challenges, and that means restoring economic growth, reducing deficits, and improving infrastructure. Paradoxically, only a more confident America can accept a reduced global status, because reconciling oneself to change is always easier once one has taken the steps needed to adjust to it.
Dominique Moisi is the author of The Geopolitics of Emotion.
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